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THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND SOCIAL REFORM
H. C. L. MERILLAT*
The first reaction of an American lawyer on looking at the pro-
visions for amending the Indian Constitution may be that the "fun-
damental rights," as guarantees of judicially enforceable rights beyond
the reach of ordinary legislation, are largely illusory. Under article
368, the basic amending provision of the Indian Constitution, the
constitution may be amended in most respects (including funda-
mental rights) by a special majority of the Parliament-a majority
of the total membership in each House and of not less than two-thirds
of the members present and voting in each House.'
Given the political realities of Congress Party control by large
majorities at the Center in the years since independence, the funda-
mental rights may be readily altered at the wishes of Congress Party
leaders. Thus, the durability and effectiveness of the fundamental
rights in India would seem to depend little on the difficulty of amend-
ing the constitution but almost wholly on legislative and executive self-
restraint and a habit of thought among influential leaders in the
government and the electorate that the rights stated in the constitution
are not lightly or hastily to be changed.
The article of the Indian Constitution dealing with the State's
taking of private property was the most hotly controverted of the fun-
damental rights among the makers of the constitution. Since that
article was finally hammered out, twelve years of litigation, judicial
interpretation, legislation and constitutional amendment have elapsed.
Experience with this article gives the student of the Indian Constitu-
tion an exceptionally rich historical background for tentative conclu-
sions about the "fundamentalness" of the fundamental rights, the
relations between the courts and Parliament (as the amending au-
thority) in shaping the basic law of India and the growth of habits of
* Consultant on Legal Studies, Ford Foundation, New Delhi, India (1958-1960).
1 Two other types of amending process are provided in certain cases. Amendments
of certain "federal clauses" of the constitution, dealing with such matters as the elec-
tion and powers of the President, the composition and powers of the higher judiciary,
and distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the states, require not
only the special majority in Parliament but approval by the legislatures in at least
half the states. Certain provisions of the constitution (mainly transitional or temporary
provisions covering the change-over from British rule to an independent status, but also
including the authority to change the boundaries of the states) may be changed by the
ordinary process of legislation calling for a simple majority in Parliament. See Joshi,
"Operations and Effect of the Amending Provision of the Constitution of India," Public
Law Problems in India 108-116 (L.F. Ebb, ed. 1957).
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thought which, far more than the formulae of words contained in the
constitution, will determine whether there are certain ground rules of
state behavior that are somewhat removed from the arena of political
pressures and passions.
Moreover, the constitutional provisions regarding property rights
give one important indication as to how India has dealt with the per-
plexing problem of assuring a more widespread sharing of economic
improvement among a poor and massive population without discour-
aging the processes of production upon which that improvement de-
pends.
On the one hand, with independence came hopes of the poor to
become less poor, resentments of foreign control over important seg-
ments of production, demands to get rid of feudal wealth and privilege,
and decision by India's new rulers that an essential element in rapid
economic growth would be large-scale efforts financed and controlled
by the organs of State. The directive principles of state policy in the
constitution, though not justiciable in the courts, include general ex-
pressions of such aims to guide state action. Article 39, for example,
provides that:
The State shall, in particular, direct its policy toward secur-
ing . . . (b) that the ownership and control of the material re-
sources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve
the common good; (c) that the operation of the economic system
does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of pro-
duction to the common detriment ....
On the other hand, there was a recognition that the capital and
effort essential for economic growth would be discouraged by laws
unsettling property rights. Moreover, large landowners and the busi-
ness community have a substantial voice in Indian political affairs. In
this interplay of hopes and interests, responsible rulers must eventually
decide what specific protection to property will be given and what
kinds of state intervention will be authorized.
In addition, the efforts for rapid economic development have gen-
erated needs for large-scale infusions of capital from abroad. Not only
the local Indian investor but the foreign investor wants to know what
degree of protection he can expect for his investments. Thus the
degree of constitutional protection for property rights has important
implications for international relations and transactions.2
2 As Professor Julius Stone has pointed out, newly independent states, formerly
under foreign political and economic domination, want freedom of action to deal with
debts, concessions, commercial engagements, and other obligations from the colonial
past. He considers this one of the main reasons for the reluctance of the new states to
accept compulsory third-party judgment "according to a traditional law which they
feel generally to favour creditor states." Stone, "A Common Law for Mankind?" Inter-
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The basic legal ground rules, as they have emerged in the first
twelve years of independent India, are found mainly in the constitu-
tional provisions and interpretations here discussed.
With these factors in mind, let us look at the actual history of
constitutional development (and to a lesser extent, the attendant
legislation in the years since independence) as they affect property
rights in India.
FIRST PHASE: THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION AND LAND REFORM
The authors of the Indian Constitution adopted the idea of a Bill
of Rights, enforceable in the courts, with which legislation and execu-
tive action must accord. The "fundamental rights" became part III
of the constitution. They included the guarantee of the procedural
"right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of rights conferred by this part."3 Any law (including
regulations, orders and the like) made by "the State" (referring to
both the Union and the state legislatures and governments) abridging
or taking away the fundamental rights is expressly stated to be void
to the extent of the inconsistency.4
The two articles of the constitution bearing most directly on
property rights are article 31, dealing with the compulsory acquisition
of property, and article 19, guaranteeing certain "rights to freedom"
to citizens, including the rights to acquire, hold and dispose of prop-
erty and to carry on any occupation, trade or business. The exercise of
the rights in article 19 is subject to "reasonable restrictions" imposed
by the State "in the interests of the general public."5
Article 31 was one of the most hotly debated in the Constituent
Assembly and, behind the scenes, in the Congress Party. caucus. The
controversy centered largely on the issue of what measure of "com-
pensation" should be paid to the zamindars and other intermediaries
national Studies 429-31 (1960) (Publication of the Indian School of International
Studies, New Delhi).
3 Article 32, which empowers the Supreme Court "to issue directions or orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo war-
ranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate for the enforcement of the funda-
mental rights." Article 226 confers similar but broader powers on the high courts,
which may issue directions, orders, etc., not only to enforce the fundamental rights but
"for any other purpose." In the first seven years of the courts' existence, 3,497 pro-
ceedings were instituted under this section, while 2,126 Civil Appeals and 794 Criminal
Appeals were instituted. In the three years 1954-1956, more than 30,000 writ petitions
were instituted in the high courts of the states under article 226. Reform of Judicial
Administration, 14th Report of the Law Commission of India, Vol. I, 60-2 and Vol. II,
659-60 (1958).
4 Article 13.
5 For the full text of articles 19 and 31, see Appendix infra pp. 642-46.
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between the State and the tillers of the soil. These intermediaries, who
had originally been tax-farmers collecting land revenue for the Moghul
and British rulers who created them, had become entrenched as land-
lords. The intermediary kept the difference between the amount of
revenue he collected and the fixed amount he had undertaken to pay
the government. He had acquired many of the attributes of a land-
owner, such as the right to evict tenants and fix rents.
The Congress had pledged itself to abolish the zamindari system.6
The battle-lines among the constitution makers were drawn mainly
on the issue of what, if any, compensation to zamindars was appro-
priate. The controversy was settled by a compromise formula. As so
often happens with a compromise, the formula meant different things
to different people, and the controversy continued in the courts and in
the Parliament.
7
The article as finally drafted and included in the original consti-
tution stated a general rule that no property shall be "taken possession
of or acquired" for a public purpose unless the authorizing law pro-
vides for compensation and either fixes the amount of compensation
or specifies the principles by which compensation is to be determined.
Then followed certain exceptions which had the effect of exempting
from the general rule land-reform legislation pending or enacted at the
time the constitution came into effect, provided that the President
(that is, the Government of India) had given his assent. Such legisla-
tion could not be called into question in any court of law on the ground
that it violated the general rule, including the requirement for com-
pensation.8
Under the constitutional distribution of legislative powers between
the Center and the states, land tenures, land revenue, and related mat-
6 The Election Manifesto of the Congress, 1946, said: "The reform of the land
system, which is so urgently needed in India, involves the removal of intermediaries
between the peasant and the State. The rights of such intermediaries should therefore
be acquired on payment of equitable compensation."
In the debate on the Constitution (first amendment) Bill, this exchange took place:
Prime Minister: If there is one thing to which we as a party have been committed
in the past generation or so, it is the agrarian reform and the abolition of the zamindari
system.
Shri Hussain Iman: With compensation.
Prime Minister: With adequate and proper compensation, not too much.
Shri Hussain Iman: "Adequate" is enough.
12 Lok Sabha Debates (hereafter referred to as L.S. Deb.) Part I, 8830 (1951).
7 For a fuller account of the Constituent Assembly Debates on this point, see
Merillat, "Compensation for the Taking of Property-A Historical Footnote to Bela
Banerjee's Case," 1 Journal of Indian Law Institute (J.I.L.I.) 384-92 (1959).
8 See text in Appendix infra.
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ters were state subjects." Thus there was no uniform pattern of zamin-
dari-abolition laws and other land reform measures. The usual for-
mula was to fix the rate of compensation for zamindars and similar
intermediaries as a multiple of the net income, or "net assets" from
their estates. Small intermediaries were generally allowed a higher
multiple than larger ones. Much depended of course, on the precise
items allowed as gross income or assets and the deductions required
to arrive at net income.'0
At the end of the first Five-Year Plan in 1956 the Planning Com-
mission reported that "intermediaries have been abolished almost en-
tirely throughout the country, but a few pockets remain where action
is still needed." Compensation payable for the acquisition of interme-
diary interests was estimated at Rs.615 billion (about $1.3 billion)
including Rs.86 crores for rehabilitation grants to former interme-
diaries and Rs.150 crores for interest payments. These compensation
payments were spread over a period of years (often in the form of
payments on special bonds)."
The abolition of intermediaries was only one step in a complex of
land reform measures that have still not been fully enacted or carried
9 The principal relevant entries from List II of the Seventh Schedule, the "State
List" of legislative powers, are:
Entry 18: Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the
relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation
of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization.
Entry 45: Land revenue, including the assessment and collection of revenue, the
maintenance of land records, survey for revenue purposes and records of rights, and
alienation of revenues.
Entry 46: Taxes on agricultural income.
10 For example, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 1950 (as
amended) provided for a computation of "gross assets," including actual rents payable
by tenants and other under-proprietors; average annual income for ten years prior to
vesting from items such as bazaars, fairs and fisheries; average annual income (for four
prior years) from rents of building sites and forests; average annual income (over past
12 years) from mines and minerals. From "gross assets" deduct land revenue, land taxes,
and agricultural income tax payable in the previous agricultural year; 159 of gross
assets as cost of management and irrecoverable arrears of rent; average of income tax
paid on royalties from mines and minerals; 95% of gross income from mines directly
worked; and an adjustment for lands held in personal cultivation. These deductions
from gross assets give the "net assets." Compensation is to be paid at eight times the
net assets.
The State of Orissa found an ingenious device for greatly reducing the amount of
compensation while adhering in form to a typical "gross income minus expenses"
formula. It provided, as usual, for a deduction of agricultural income tax from "gross
assets" and at the same time greatly increased the agricultural tax for the year used to
reckon gross assets. This was challenged, unsuccessfully, as "colorable legislation" deny-
ing compensation in K.C.G. Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa (1953) S.C.R.




out. These include measures to protect tenants from eviction, ceilings
on individual holdings, transfers of excess holdings to landless laborers,
restrictions on rent increases, consolidation of scattered holdings into
contiguous areas, and encouragement of co-operative farming.'2 It is
beyond the scope of this article to attempt to review the extent to which
these measures have been effective. Our present interest lies in the
constitutional questions related to land reforms. That story starts with
the efforts of zamindars to block, on constitutional grounds, state laws
abolishing their interests.
The debates in the Constituent Assembly make it clear that those
who hammered out the compromise formula on compensation for com-
pulsory acquisition intended to place the zamindari abolition laws
beyond challenge in the courts.' 3 The zamindars and other interme-
diaries, however, were quick to challenge the constitutionality of state
laws affecting their interests. In the first year after the constitution
came into effect, three such cases reached state high courts. 14 In one
of these, Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar,15 the Patna High Court
held the Bihar Land Reforms Act invalid as inconsistent, not with
article 31(2), but with article 14.
Article 31(4), which saved pending legislation later approved by
the President, only protected the act in question against judicial review
under the provisions of article 31(2). The zamindars had also invoked
article 14, guaranteeing equality before the law, and the court held
that the Bihar law, providing a graduated scale of compensation re-
lated to the size of the landholdings, set up an unreasonably discrim-
inatory classification. Although the court was barred from inquiring
into the adequacy of compensation, it made clear its view that com-
pensation meant equivalent value.
The government moved quickly to head off the attacks on land
reform legislation. The Prime Minister, introducing the Constitution
(first amendment) Bill in the Lok Sabha (House of Peoples) on
May 8, 1951, recalled that it had been the intention of the constitu-
tion-makers "to take away the question of zamindari and land reform
from the purview of the courts." He was particularly scornful that the
Bihar High Court had invoked article 14 to strike down the Bihar
Act: "this business of the equality of the law may very well mean, as
it has come to mean often enough, making rigid the existing inequities
before the law. That is ... dangerous in a changing society and it is
12 See, Review of the First Five Year Plan, supra, at 317-31 and Second Five
Year Plan, Planning Commission (1956) 177-213.
13 Merillat, op. cit. supra note 7.
14 See Basu, Commentary On The Constitution Of India (3d ed.) 823.
15 A.I.R. (1951) Patna 91.
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completely opposed to the whole structure and method of this consti-
tution and what is laid down in the directive principles (of state
policy) .M16
The first amendment was adopted. It affected land reform legis-
lation in two ways. It added a new section (31(A)) to article 31 pro-
viding that no law affecting rights in "estates" should be considered
void on the ground that it is inconsistent with any of the fundamental
rights conferred by part III."7 Its second main provision (so far as
compulsory acquisition of property was concerned), was specifically
to validate, with retrospective effect, thirteen state land reform laws.18
The zamindars of Bihar attacked the validity of the first amend-
ment itself, primarily on the ground that the Parliament which had
enacted it by the special majority prescribed by the constitution was
still the one-house Constituent Assembly acting as Parliament, and
not the two-house Parliament contemplated by the amending pro-
visions of the constitution. This attack failed. The Supreme Court
upheld the first amendment.19
At least one of the Supreme Court justices thought that the
amendment had quite definitely settled the constitutional law as it
applied to land reform and that further challenges by the zamindars
must fail. When the Kameshwar Singh case (the High Court decision
which had led to the first amendment) reached the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Sastri had this to say:
The fact of the matter is the zamindars lost the battle in the last
round when this Court upheld the constitutionality of (the First
Amendment, which had) the object, among others, of putting an
end to this litigation. And it is no disparagement to their learned
counsel to say that what remained of the campaign has been fought
with such weak arguments as overtaxed ingenuity could suggest.20
SECOND PHASE: FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1951) TO THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT (1955) LAND REFORM MEASURES
The majority of his brethren did not agree with the Chief Justice's
conclusion in the Kameshwar Singh case. Many more years of litiga-
tion showed that the zamindars' lawyers had not yet exhausted their
ingenuity.
In the Kameshwar Singh case, three of the five-man Constitu-
16 12 L.S. Deb., Part 2, 9083 (1951).
17 "Estates" is here used in a technical sense to describe interests relating to land
tenures, varying from locality to locality with local forms of tenure.
18 See article 31B and Ninth Schedule.
19 Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India (1952) S.C.R. 89.
20 Id. at 99.
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tion Bench struck down two provisions of the Bihar Land Reform
in spite of the first amendment. The challenge was no longer based
on article 14. The grounds of attack which the Justices accepted, in
varying combinations, were that certain provisions2 offended (1)
against an inherent need in eminent domain that an acquisition be for
a "public purpose" and (2) against entry 42 in the list of concurrent
Union and state legislative powers which mentioned "principles on
which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned .... " The
majority held that the entry imposed a duty to fix real principles of
compensation and that this was not done in the two provisions under
attack. The decision of the divided court in the Kameshwar Singh
case was not one of the clearest in the history of the Indian Supreme
Court. Nevertheless, counsel for landholders pressed on it a new round
of litigation. In subsequent decisions, however, the ruling was held
strictly to its special facts and other attacks on land reform legislation
based on the arguments in the Bihar case have failed. In two com-
panion cases, decided the same day as the Bikar case, the court
unanimously upheld the Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh acts
abolishing zamindaris and similar estates in land. In fact the Su-
preme Court, with one exception2 3 has never again struck down any
law abolishing intermediaries as being in conflict with the fundamental
rights. Other land reform legislation reaching the Supreme Court has
been upheld as constitutional including acts affecting tenants' security
of tenure, regulation of rents, consolidation of holdings, and ceilings
on holdings. 4
The first amendment to the constitution was enacted before any
petitions challenging the zamindari-abolition laws and related legisla-
tion had been decided by the Supreme Court. Accordingly we can
never know what decisions the court might have reached in the ab-
21 These provisions vested in the state 50% of arrears of rent due to the landlord
and excluded from the landlord's annual income (which served as a basis for computing
compensation) an arbitrary amount deemed to be required for building works for tenants.
22 Raya Suriya Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1952) S.C.R. 1056 and
Vismesbar Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) S.C.R. 1020.
23 In State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar Singhji (1954) S.C.R. 279, the court held
that, under article 14, the state law taking over jagir interests in certain territories in
the state was invalid unless extended to all territories within the state. Most of the
zamindari abolition laws have been protected by article 31(4) and (6) as intended by
the constitution-makers. See statutes and cases noted by Basu, op. cit. supra note 14
at 362-64 and 366.
24 See Thakur Raghubir Singh v. State of Ajmer, (1959) S. Ct. Jour. 629 and
Shri Keshan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1955) 2 S.C.R. 53 (control of land rents);
State of W. Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1954) S.C.R. 587 (protection against evic-
tion); Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. (1959) S.C. 519; Sri Ram Ram Narain
Mebdi v. State of Bombay (1959) (ceilings on land holdings).
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sence of the first amendment. In any case, whatever doubts may
have existed concerning the validity of land reform legislation, they
appear to have been effectively removed by that amendment.
Takings of Property Other than by Land Reform Measures
When we move away from land reform measures, however, we
find a different situation. In the Constituent Assembly debates on
article 31 the Prime Minister had drawn a distinction between rela-
tively small compulsory acquisitions of the sort familiar under British
rule, such as takings for public purposes under the Land Acquisition
Act, and new large-scale measures of social reform such as the abolition
of zamindaris:
Let us be quite clear that there is no question of any appropriation
without compensation so far as this Constitution is concerned. If
property is required for public use it is a well established law that
it should be acquired by the State by compulsion if necessary, and
compensation is paid and the law has laid down methods of judging
that compensation. Now, normally speaking in regard to such
acquisition-what might be called petty acquisition or acquisition
of small bits of property or even relatively large bits, if you like,
for the improvement of a town, etc.-the law has been dearly laid
down. But more and more today the community has to deal with
large schemes of social reform, social engineering etc. which can
hardly be considered from the point of view of that individual
acquisition of a small bit of land or structure.25
As we have seen, the controversy among the constitution-makers
centered largely on the question of what if any compensation should
be provided in one great scheme of social reform-the abolition of
zamindaris and related land reforms. These measures having been
largely removed from the judicial arena by the original exceptions in
article 31 and by the first amendment, it remained to determine more
precisely the meaning of the general clause relating to compulsory ac-
quisition, article 31(2).
The compromise formula adopted in the original article per-
mitted review by the courts of laws providing for compulsory ac-
quisition, unless they fell within one of the exceptions (designed, as
noted, to protect land reform measures). There was a long controversy,
however, as to just what judicial review should imply. There were
differing interpretations among the constitution-makers as to the
scope of judicial review conferred on the courts by article 31(2).
The Prime Minister made it clear that he took a very restrictive
view of the courts' power to review the amount of compensation al-
lowed by the legislature.2 6 Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, one of the
25 9 Constituent Assembly Debates (hereafter referred to as C..D.) 1192.
26 It was in this debate that Prime Minister Nehru made his often quoted remarks
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most respected and influential of the framers, appeared to think that
"compensation," even apart from the excepted zamindari-abolition
measures, need not always mean equivalence in value and made a
bow to legislative superiority on matters within their competence. He
pointed out, however, that "if the legislation is a colorable device, a
contrivance to outstep the limits of the legislative power or .. .is a
fraudulent exercise of the power, the court may pronounce the legis-
lation to be invalid or ultra vires."2 7
In a third major viewpoint, from Mr. K. M. Munshi who pre-
sented the compromise formula in the Constituent Assembly, there are
different nuances, including specific references to compensation as an
equivalent in value to the property taken." In the end the power of
the courts to review cases of compulsory acquisition in the light of
article 31(2) was saved, but with a clear warning from high places
that they must exercise the power with circumspection.
Some laws apart from land reform were saved by article 31(4)-
(6), by virtue of having been enacted within the prescribed time and
approved by the President (or because they were "existing" laws when
the constitution came into effect).9 A considerable number and va-
riety of disputes involving statutes not saved by those exceptions began
coming to the courts after the first amendment. Statutes involving
state acquisitions or interferences with property rights that fell outside
the land reform program were challenged. Even though some could
hardly be said to involve "large schemes of social reform," the gov-
ernment felt that a growing body of adverse decisions was hampering
its plans for social and economic development. It finally secured the
passage of the Constitution (fourth amendment) Act in 1955, to
curtail the power of the courts to review laws authorizing compulsory
acquisitions or requisitions or other interferences with private prop-
erty rights.
Four cases30 decided within the span of a year are the landmarks
about the limited role of the judiciary in the Indian Constitutional structure:
"Within limits, no judge and no Supreme Court can make itself a third chamber.
No Supreme Court and no Judiciary can stand in judgment over the sovereign will of
Parliament representing the will of the entire community. If we go wrong here and
there it can point it out, but in the ultimate analysis, where the future of the community
is concerned, no Judiciary can come in the way." 9 CA.D. No. 31, 1159.
27 9 C.A.D. No. 32, 1271-2.
28 For a more detailed account of the debate, see Merillat, op. cit. supra note 7.
29 See Basu, op. cit. supra note 14.
30 Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. (1955) S.C.R. 707, A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 728, decided
October 13, 1954; Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.
(1954) S.C.R. 674, A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 119, decided December 18, 1953; State of West
Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1954) S.C.R. 587, A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 92, decided Decem-
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of this phase, and were primarily responsible for the government's
decision to enact the fourth amendment. Many questions have arisen
and continue to arise under the constitutional provisions relating to
compulsory acquisitions by the State. Our inquiry here focuses on two
central issues involved in the four cases: what is the meaning of
"compensation," and what sort of taking or deprivation requires the
payment of compensation?
What is "Compensation?"
In 1953, the Supreme Court held in the Bela Banerjee case that
compensation as used in article 31 of the constitution meant equiva-
lence in value.31 This case involved a state acquisition of lands under
the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, under which
compensation was limited to market value on December 31, 1946.
That date had been chosen to prevent land speculators from bene-
fiting by the sharp rise in land values that followed the war, inde-
pendence, and the influx of refugees from Pakistan. Those whose lands
had been taken for a housing development sought to have the ac-
quisition set aside on the ground, among others, that the amount paid
by the State was not compensation within the constitutional meaning
of the term.
Both the High Court of Calcutta and the Supreme Court agreed
with the dispossessed landowners, Harries, C. J., speaking for the High
Court said that if the compensation offered "is not a proper equivalent
then it is not compensation and anything which is unjust or unrea-
sonable can never be regarded as an equivalent." He concluded:
The principles on which and the manner in which the com-
pensation is to be determined are in my view wholly arbitrary,
and the result may have no relation whatsoever to the market
value of a land at the date of acquisition.3 2
Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri spoke for a unanimous five-man
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in upholding the decision
of the High Court.
While it is true that the legislature is given the discretionary
power of laying down the principles which should govern the deter-
mination of the amount to be given to the owner for the property
appropriated, such principles must insure that what is determined
as payable must be compensation, that is, a just equivalent of what
the owner has been deprived of. 33 (Emphasis added.)
ber 17, 1953; and Mrs. Bela Banerjee v. State of West Bengal (1954) S.C.R. 558, A.I.R.
(1954) S.C. 170, decided December 11, 1953.
31 Mrs. Bela Banerjee v. State of West Bengal (1954) S.C.R. 558, A.I.R. (1954) S.C.
32 A.I.R. (1951) Calcutta 111, at 115.
33 Op. cit. supra note 14, at 563.
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The court, then, declined to interpret the original article 31 of
the constitution in a way that would have given the legislature a free
hand to fix any standard or amount of payment it chose. In thus
checking the legislative will, it brought a quick reaction from govern-
ment quarters. As already noted, the fourth amendment was enacted,
forbidding the courts to review the adequacy of compensation. The
amendment seemed, however, to leave open the question whether there
could be "principles" for determining compensation other than some-
thing like market value or other test of actual value to the owner at
the time of acquisition. In some recent decisions, the high courts have
shown a disposition to hold that if no payment is made at all in respect
to part of properties taken over by the State, then in that case at least
no "principles of compensation" have been laid down. 4
What is "Deprivation?"
The Banerjee case was a straightforward instance of state ac-
quisition of an isolated parcel of land, of the kind that would normally
fall under the Land Acquisition Act. The State itself took title, which
it turned over to a co-operative society for building purposes. In the
three other major cases now under consideration, the court extended
the notion of a deprivation sufficient to attract the compensation re-
quirement to other instances in which state action substantially de-
prived the owner of benefits of ownership without itself formally
taking possession of or acquiring title to the property in question.
In Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co.,
Ltd.,3" the court held, on the petition of a preference shareholder in
the Sholapur Co., that an act placing the company in the hands of
agents appointed by the government was in effect a deprivation of
property without compensation and therefore invalid under article 31.
In State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal case,36 a landlord had
challenged a West Bengal statute depriving him of the right to evict
tenants from lands he had earlier purchased at a revenue sale. The act,
however, also authorized certain increases in rent, a new benefit to the
34 See Namasivaya v. State of Madras, A.I.R. (1959) Madras 548, and cases there
cited. A Madras act authorizing state acquisition of lignite bearing land provided
compensation for the land itself but none for buildings on the land built after passage
of the act.
35 (1954) S.C.R. 674; A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 119, decided December 18, 1953. Chiranjit
Lal v. Union of India (1950) S.C.R. 869, A.I.R. (1951) S.C. 41 involved the same act
and same company. There the holder of a single ordinary share unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the validity of the state's take-over. In the Shrinivas case, the petitioner, a
preferred shareholder, had been ordered by the government managers of the company
to pay in additional capital.
36 1954 S.C.R. 587; A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 92, decided December 17, 1953.
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owner which Chief Justice Sastri thought offset the deprivation of the
right to evict tenants. On these facts he thought that the impairment
of the property owner's enjoyment was not serious enough to call into
play the requirement for compensation.
In this decision, the Chief Justice sought to formulate the test
for distinguishing between cases where governmental interference with
property rights would require compensation and cases where it would
not. In terms that would be familiar to American lawyers, he said:
No cut and dried test can be formulated as to whether in a given
case the owner is "deprived" of his property within the meaning
of Article 31; each case must be decided as it arises on its own
facts. Broadly speaking, it may be said that an abridgement
would be so substantial as to amount to a deprivation within the
meaning of Article 31 if, in effect, it withheld the property from the
possession and enjoyment of the owner, or seriously impaired its
use and enjoyment by him, or materially reduced its value.37
In Saghir Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 106 private bus op-
erators challenged a U.P. law under which the state could take over
routes previously plied by private operators under license from the
state, revoking their licenses if need be. The Supreme Court, applying
the doctrines of the Subodh Gopal and Dwarkadas Shrinivas cases,
held that even though the state had not itself acquired the right of the
bus operators, it had deprived them of valuable property (that is, their
right to use the public highways for paid transportation services) Y3
Mr. Justice Mukherjea, speaking for a unanimous court, had this to
say:
The fact that the buses belonging to the appellants have not
been acquired by the government is... not material. The property
of a business may be both tangible and intangible. Under the
statute the government may not deprive the appellants of their
buses or any other tangible property, but they are depriving them
of the business of running buses on hire on public roads.
In this cluster of decisions handed down in December, 1953, the
court had pronounced that the "compensation" required by article 31
meant equivalence in value at the time an owner was deprived of his
property, and that the deprivation sufficient to attract the require-
ment of compensation could be a substantial impairment of the fruits
37 Id. at 618.
38 Saghir Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1954) S.C.R. 728. Note Mr. Justice
Mukherjea's distinction at 735 between the American rule (that, although the public
-has the right to use streets and public ways, use for gain is "special and extraordinary"
and may be prohibited or regulated) and the Indian, which does not require a franchise
for the use of highways for gain, "Within the limits imposed by State regulations, any
member of the public can ply motor vehicles on a public road. To that extent, he can
also carry on the business of transporting passengers with the aid of the vehicles."
[Vol. 21
INDIA N PROPERTY RIGHTS
of enjoying property even though the State had not formally acquired
or taken possession of the property. These holdings, familiar to the
American constitutional lawyer within the American system, were un-
acceptable to the Indian Government. They considered the decisions
embarrassing, and possibly fatal, to plans for the expansion of the
public sector in industry and commerce and for the regulation of the
economy in the general public interest. The Constitution (fourth
amendment) Act was passed in 1955 to override these and other
awkward decisions.
The Fourth Amendment and After
The fourth amendment, among other things, barred the applica-
tion of article 31(2) to government takings or deprivations of prop-
erty that do not transfer title or possession to the state. It also barred,
as against an acquisition or requisition of the kinds specified in article
31A, any attack based on the "fundamental rights" embodied in
article 14 ("equality before the law" and "equal protection of the
law"), article 19 (the rights to acquire, hold and dispose of property
and to carry on any occupation, trade or business, subject to "reason-
able restrictions" on the exercise of those rights) and article 31. Thus,
the amendment protected a broad range of state interventions in
private business affairs and dealings in property which the govern-
ment had in mind as parts of its program for economic and social
advancement. Under the constitution as it now stands, there are still
certain checks on the government's powers to take property. There
must, presumably, be some degree of compensation in cases of ac-
quisition or requisition .3 The acquisition must be for a "public pur-
pose." It must be authorized by a statute.
The government has even continued to provide a measure of
indemnity in some cases where it would not be strictly required under
the constitution in its new form. The Motor Vehicles Act, for ex-
ample, provides for payments to private transport operators whose
licenses are cancelled and routes taken over by state-owned services.
These payments are based on formulae that take into account the
length of the routes involved and the duration of unexpired terms of
the licenses involved.40 Some state governments, however, have shown
considerable ingenuity and persistence in taking measures (some of
which have been held invalid by the Supreme Court) to circumvent the
statutory requirement of compensation."
39 See Namasivaya v. State of Madras, supra note 34.
40 Clause 63-G, Motor Vehicles Act 1939 as amended by Motor Vehicles (Amend-
ment) Act, 1956 (enacted after the fourth amendment to the constitution).
41 E.g., see Y. Mahaboob Sheriff v. Mysore State Trans. Authority, Bangalore,
1960)
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The central and state governments appear to have used their
powers to fix the amount of compensation in a way reassuring to the
investors, particularly where foreign interests are involved. The degree
of compensation allowed in three major nationalization measures
enacted after the fourth amendment has apparently been generally
acceptable to the investors. The State Bank of India Act of 1955,
taking over the Imperial Bank, provided compensation in a fixed
amount (about 1765 rupees per share) payable in central government
securities. The Life Insurance Corporation Act of 1956, taking over
privately owned life insurance companies, provided three formulae
for compensation designed to approximate real worth, with the right
to appeal to a special tribunal in cases where insurers were dissatisfied
with the determination of the new government corporation. In one
major state (as distinct from Union) acquisition involving foreign
interests, the Kolar Gold Mining Undertakings (Acquisition) Act of
1956 specified in the act itself the amount to be paid to the four
privately owned companies taken over. According to one report, the
amount was a compromise between the owners' claim and the govern-
ment's offer, though much closer to the latter.
A more recent nationalization measure, The Coal Bearing Areas
(Acquisition and Development) Act of 1957 authorizes the govern-
ment to acquire coal-bearing lands or mining rights in such land. For
the land itself, the act provides compensation at the market value of
the land, excluding the value of minerals lying under the land. For
rights under a mining lease, the compensation is based generally on
actual expenditures incurred by the previous holder, plus interest 3
At the political level, there continues to be agitation for nation-
alization of productive enterprise and services." The present gov-
ernments, however, have not only declined to move toward any wide-
A.I.R. (1960) S.C. 321; Shrinivasa Reddy v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. (1960) S.C. 350;
G. Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Trans. Corp., A.I.R. (1959) S.C. 308;
Moti Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. (1951) Allahabad 257.
42 See Friedmann, "Joint International Business Ventures in India" (A research
study of Columbia University Law School, 1959) 42. The same study generally dis-
cusses nationalization measures at 38-43.
43 Though the information comes from hearsay, it is perhaps worth noting informal
reports that the government's acquisition of mining leases has led to some troublesome
negotiations with foreign interests regarding compensation.
44 See e.g., Hindustan Times, Sept. 16, 1959 (report that government was consid-
ering nationalization of sugar mills) ; Times of India, Aug. 14, 1959 (government state-
ment that it was not considering nationalization of the general insurance business);
Statesman, Aug. 7, 1959 (government planning to state that it was not going to national-
ize banks); Statesman, Aug. 7, 1959 (ministerial statement that nationalization of elec-
tricity undertakings is desirable, but not financially feasible except on selective basis);




spread scheme of nationalization but have shown restraint in using
their constitutional powers to determine the amount of compensation
in the few instances where nationalization has taken place. The Prime
Minister took particular pains to reassure foreign investors when the
fourth amendment was being debated.45
Whatever assurances exist at the political level, the prospective
foreign investor may want more specific assurances in a legally en-
forceable form. The American investor may now get this assurance
through the investment guaranty agreement between the United States
and India.4' That agreement, which earlier had guaranteed the in-
vestor that his rupee earnings and capital would be convertible into
dollars, was extended on December 7, 1959, to cover risks of expro-
priation without adequate compensation. The United States Govern-
ment undertakes to reimburse in dollars an insured investor for losses
that may be incurred because of expropriation and is subrogated to
the rights of the investor in India. The Government of India has under-
taken first to negotiate the settlement of any claims thus arising and,
in case a settlement cannot be reached between the two governments,
to refer the claim to a tribunal of arbitrators for a "final and binding
determination." This commitment by the Government of India is pre-
sumably considered consistent with the provision of the Indian Con-
stitution (as amended by the fourth amendment) that no law pro-
viding for compulsory acquisition or requisition shall, under article
31(2) "be called in question in any court on the ground that the com-
pensation provided by law is not adequate."
On the occasion of signing the agreement relating to expropria-
tion, the Indian representative issued a statement saying, among other
things,
The principles embodied in the Agreement signed today by both
our countries are the same as those embodied in our Constitution.
This states that should at any time for any reasons an industrial
enterprise be nationalized, appropriate compensation will be paid.
With the signing of this agreement American investment in
India will have the same guarantee of safety from the American
Government that it has always had from the Indian Govern-
ment.47
45 The Prime Minister stated: "I am always surprised to hear this proposal being
put forward repeatedly: confiscate or expropriate foreign capital. Anything which is
more unthinkable, unthought of and unrealistic-I cannot imagine; it has no relation
to reality-this kind of thing-quite apart from what we may do within our country...
No country wants to break its international relations or its credit in the world by doing
this kind of thing in order to save some money-a few crores (tens of millions) or a
few millions." 3 L.S. Deb. Part 2, 4840 (1955).
-6 Authorized by § 413(b)(4) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.
47 Dept. of State Press Release No. 842, December 7, 1959.
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In the light of the foregoing discussion, this will be seen as a
statement of intention, practice, and policy rather than as an accurate
summary of Indian constitutional law. The legal protection given by
the original article 31 has been greatly restricted by later amendments.
Indeed, the principal remaining haven for the property owner or
private businessman (if he is a citizen) who considers himself ag-
grieved by state intervention is now found, not in article 31, but in
article 19.
THE CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO HOLD PROPERTY AND CONDUCT A
BUSINESS: ARTICLE 19(1)
Specific Interests in Property under Article 19
Two clauses of article 19(1) provide that "all citizens shall have
the right ... to acquire, hold, and dispose of property, and.., to carry
on any occupation, trade or business." These rights are qualified by
later clauses enabling the State to make laws imposing "reasonable
restrictions" on the exercise of the rights "in the interests of the gen-
eral public."
At one time some of the Supreme Court took the view that these
guarantees related to the capacity of Indian citizens to own property
and carry on a business and did not protect a citizen's interest in a
particular piece of property or business from state interference. 4
In a series of later cases, however, it became established doctrine
that article 19(1) (f) and (g) is available to protect specific property
rights of individual citizens against "unreasonable" state restrictions.49
48 See State of W. Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1954) S.C.R. 587 at 596-99. Chief
Justice Sastri found some support for this view in sections 111 and 298 of the Govern-
ment of India Act, 1935, which forbade the state to impose "disabilities" on British
subjects in India or Indian subjects to hold property or carry on business on grounds
of religion, place of birth, descent or color. In the Indian Constitution, however, pro-
tection against discrimination on these grounds is found in articles 15 and 16.
See also Basu, op. cit. supra note 14, at 227-29 who, writing in 1955, concluded that
"the uncertainty of the boundary between article 19(1)(f) and article 31(1) continues."
49 See Diwan Sugar and General Mills (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India A.I.R.
(1959) S.C. 626; Express Newspapers, Ltd. v. Union of India A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 578;
Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. v. State of Bombay A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 328; M.C.V.S.
Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras; Ch. Tiku Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1956)
S.C.R. 393; Bijay Cotton Mills v. State of Ajmer (1955) S.C.R. 752; Comm'r Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras v. Swamiar of Sri Shirar Mutt, (1954) S.C.R. 1005;
Harishankar Bagla v. Madhya Pradesh (1955) S.C.R. 380; Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi
Narain v. State of U.P. (1954) S.C.R. 803; State of Rajasthan v. Nath Mal (1954)
S.C.R. 982, A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 307; Saghir Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R.
(1954) S.C. 728; Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer, A.I.R. (1953) S.C. 373;




Clearly, on this view of article 19, there might be considerable
overlap with article 31. An aggrieved property owner or businessman
(if he was a citizen) might, and often did, claim both that a particular
state intervention had deprived him of his property without compensa-
tion (under article 31) and had unreasonably restricted his right to
hold property or carry on a trade or business (under article 19).
Initially, the Supreme Court tended toward the conclusion that
if a "restriction" (the article 19 term) on the exercise of a property
right or conduct of a business was so severe as to be "total," and
therefore a "deprivation" (the article 31 term), then its constitution-
ality must be tested under article 31. Article 19 would not apply. This
rather conceptualist approach got its start in the decision in Gopalan's
case," decided early in 1950 shortly after the constitution came into
effect. The case involved the question of whether the Preventive De-
tention Act was inconsistent with the citizen's rights guaranteed by
article 19(1), particularly the right to freedom of movement "through-
out the territory of India." The court held that the "reasonable re-
strictions" on rights authorized by that article were different from the
"deprivation" of personal liberty mentioned in article 21. In so hold-
ing, one of the Justices went further in a dictum to state that if a
citizen was deprived of his property within the meaning of article 31,
he could not complain that his rights under article 19 had been in-
fringed, for he had no property right that could be considered as
"restricted."'"
More than four years later, in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji,52
the court applied this reasoning when occupiers of leased premises
were challenging a land requisition act under which they were to be
ousted from their premises. The court held that article 19(1) (f) did
not apply: "when there is a substantial deprivation of property which
is already held and enjoyed, one must turn to Article 31 to see how
that is justified. '53
With the enactment of the fourth amendment, barring the ap-
plication of article 31 to interferences other than direct state acquisi-
tion or requisition, the possibility of applying article 19 to other sub-
stantial deprivations assumed a new importance. May a state "dep-
rivation" of property of a kind no longer challengeable under article
31 still be attacked under article 19? For a long time after the fourth
amendment, the court declined to make a direct pronouncement on
G0 A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) S.C.R. 88; A.I.R. (1950) S.C. 27.
51 Id. S.C.R. at 304.
52 State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, (1955) S.C.R. 777; A.I.R. (1955) S.C. 41.
53 Id. at 780 and 44.
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the question. In the past year, however, two decisions seem to have
settled the matter.54
In Narendra Kumar v. Union of India," the court dealt with a
government order, under the Essential Commodities Act, which reg-
ulated trade in copper. One part of the order controlled the price of
imported copper at a level that would make impossible a profit for
middlemen between importers and industrial users. Another part for-
bade the acquisition of copper by anyone except under a permit issued
by the Controller "in accordance with such principles as the Central
Government may from time to time specify." The government later
issued instructions under which permits were to be issued only to in-
dustrial users, cutting out middlemen altogether.
The court's decision turned on the failure to issue these instruc-
tions in the Official Gazette. It felt called upon, however, to decide
whether the elimination of dealers through the price control order
and the ban on permits to them amounted to "a mere restriction on the
rights under article 19(1) (f) and 19(1) (g) or goes beyond restric-
tion."
The court concluded, after an examination of earlier cases and
the apparent intention of the drafters of the constitution, that a "pro-
hibition" on the exercise of rights was a form of "restriction." It then
went on to examine the reasonableness of the restrictions contained in
the copper order under article 19(1). The court found the restrictions
substantively sound (as a reasonable regulation of trade in an im-
portant scarce commodity) but procedurally bad since the govern-
ment had not satisfied the legislated requirements for publishing orders
under the act.
The court did not explicitly deal with the contention (which does
not appear to have been developed in argument before them) that a
severe restriction of the kind involved in the copper order could be
regarded as a "deprivation" of property which must be considered
solely in terms of article 31. It did, however, adopt the view that the
issue before it could not be decided by a conceptualistic distinction
between "restriction" and "prohibition."
A few months later, in K. K. Kochunni v. State of Kerala and
54 The fourth amendment also materially alters the guarantees under article 19.
A new article 31A provided that laws of certain specified kinds affecting rights in land,
state management or regulation of the private management or regulation of the private
management of companies, and rights arising under mineral leases, should not be held
invalid on the ground that they are inconsistent with any of the rights conferred by
articles 14, 19 or 31, subject to the requirements of Presidential assent for state acts.
For full text, see appendix infra p. 644.
55 Writ Petition No. 85 of 1958, decided December 3, 1959; not yet reported.
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Madras," the court explicitly held "that a law made depriving a
citizen of his property shall be void, unless the law so made complies
with the provisions of Cl. (5) of Article 19 of the Constitution." There,
the court was dealing with a state law providing that a certain local
form of estate in land should be deemed to be another form of estate
with the result that the owner's interest would have passed to others
in his joint family. The court held that this deprivation must be tested
for reasonableness under article 19 (5) and found it unreasonable. They
distinguished the Gopalan case on the ground that it involved personal
liberty rather than property interests. They also disinguished the
Bhazji Munji case on the ground that the fourth amendment, by
restricting the application of article 31 (2) to instances where the State
acquired or requisitioned property, had left other instances of dep-
rivation to be tested by the requirement that they be authorized by
"law." Such a law, in their view, must satisfy the requirements of
article 19, imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest of the
general public.
This far-reaching decision was reached by a Constitution Bench
divided three to two. It has important implications not only for prop-
erty rights but personal liberties. Would the Gopalan case, for ex-
ample, not be decided differently, reading into the phrase "procedure
established by law" a requirement that the "law" be tested for rea-
sonableness under article 19? In the Kochunni case, Mr. Justice
Subba Rao, speaking for the majority, commented that some of the
court would now be inclined to agree with Mr. Justice Fazl Ali's dis-
sent in the Gopalan case but added that the court is bound by the
judgment in that case.
In any event, it may be taken for granted that litigants, in matters
involving both property rights and personal liberties, will press the
advantage offered by the Kochunni judgment. It is not unusual for
the Indian Supreme Court, in close and important questions, par-
ticularly those possibly leading to important new doctrines, to con-
stitute a special bench of all members of the court, or at least a larger
number than the usual five on the Constitution Bench. Perhaps the
issues in the Kockunni case will again be argued before a larger num-
ber of justices.
Always to be taken into account is the amending power. The
decision in the Kochunni case is bound to be somewhat distasteful to
government authorities. Will it lead to another constitutional amend-
ment revamping the fundamental rights relating to property rights
and personal liberties?
56 Writ Petitions No. 443 of 1955 and 40 and 41 of 1956, decided May 4, 1960;
not yet reported.
1960]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
"Reasonable Restrictions" and Economic Regulation
Normally, of course, government restrictions on the exercise of
property rights or conduct of a trade or business will fall short of
"deprivation" or "total restriction." Rather they will take the form of
regulatory measures. Among the most important have been the Essen-
tial Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946 and its successor, the
Essential Commodities Act of 1955. A considerable body of consti-
tutional doctrine has grown up about the application of article 19 to
such regulatory measures-an important field of law that cannot be
dealt with here. 7
We ought, however, at least to note briefly one important line of
cases dealing with situations that border upon state deprivation of
property without compensation in some of which litigants have indeed
invoked article 31 along with article 19.
The Central Government has had broad powers, dating from
British wartime controls, to control the purchase, sale, production,
supply and distribution of essential commodities. Producers and
dealers of such commodities, of course, have tested the constitution-
ality of these controls in the courts. The first important case to reach
the Supreme Court involved a state coal control order, issued under
the Essential Supplies Act of 1946. Coal dealers challenged the order
on the ground that it fixed a price that was unreasonably low and that
the licensing authority's power to grant and revoke licenses was ar-
bitrary and uncontrolled by higher authority. They failed on the first
point (the court finding no evidence that the prices were unjust) but
succeeded on the second. The court held that uncontrolled discretion
granted to the Controller was an unreasonable restriction on the
dealers' right to carry on business.0
Two months later the court held invalid a state food grains con-
trol order which authorized certain officials to freeze stocks of grain
in dealers' hands and to requisition the stocks at a price fixed by the
officials. The court held that the price-fixing power was too broad and
unregulated, pointing out that the authorities could (as they in fact
had done according to the affidavits of the grain dealers) buy the
stocks at a price lower than the dealers had paid for them and then
make a profit by selling at a higher controlled price. The court held
the order void under both article 19(1) (g) and 31(2). 9
57 Dr. M. P. Jain, Reader in the Delhi University Law Faculty, recently did a study
of the Essential Commodities Act and its predecessor acts which may soon become
available from the Indian Law Institute in New Delhi.
58 Messrs. Dwarka, Prasad, Laxmi, Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1954) S.C.R.
803, decided January 11, 1954.
59 State of Rajasthan v. Nath Mal (1954) S.C.R. 982, decided March 13, 1954.
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In later cases, however, the court has shown little disposition to
interfere with the regime of regulation set up under the essential sup-
plies acts. The court, upholding an order requiring that permits be
obtained to transport cotton cloth, went on to declare valid the main
authorizing sections of the act which conferred broad powers to con-
trol and regulate prices, movement, and production of essential com-
modities. Since then, the court has tended to uphold specific orders
and notifications issued under the authority of the act, even when
dealers have alleged and offered evidence that they have been forced
to sell at prices lower than their cost. 0
If one may hazard a guess at the future development of law re-
lating to commodity regulation, it would be along the following lines:
(1) Improved administrative procedures may be developed to assure
that control authorities take into account more definitely prescribed
factors in arriving at decisions on prices, requisition of stocks and the
like. (2) Parties affected by orders may be given greater opportunity
to represent their views at the rule-making stage and have more re-
course to administrative appeal.6
Corporations as "Citizens"
One difference between articles 31 and 19 is important for non-
Indians. Article 31 applies to "persons," including aliens and corpora-
tions. Article 19 applies only to "citizens."
It would seem clear that aliens, and probably corporations, are
excluded from the benefits of article 19. Part II of the constitution,
For earlier high court decisions upholding grain requisition schemes see Atulya Kumar
v. Director of Procurement and Supply, A.I.R. (1953) Calcutta 548 and Mohammed
Anzar Husnan v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. (1952) Patna 220. In the Calcutta case, Mr.
Justice Sinha gave an eloquent reminder of the special situation then prevailing in India:
"The stark reality confronts us that there is not enough food to go round and parts of
the country are constantly verging on conditions of acute shortage and even famine...
To talk of the fundamental right to hoard as one pleases, to profiteer as one pleases,
to be the Lord of one's Manor and Fief, all this sounds edifying under certain given
circumstances of peace and plenty, but it is a mockery when a man's brother sits out
in the pavement naked and unfed."
60 Union of India v. Messrs. Bhanamal Gulzarimal Ltd., A.I.R. (1960) S.C. 475;
Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1960) S.C. 430; Diwan Sugar & Gen. Mills
(Private) Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1959) S.C. 620; Lord Krishna Sugar Mills
Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1959) S.C. 1124; N.R. Chirangi Lal v. State of Bihar,
A.I.R. (1959) Patna 263.
81 See comments of Mr. Justice Hidayatullah (now on the Supreme Court) in State
v. Haidarali, A.I.R. (1957) Madhya Pradesh 179. But see also statement by Mr. justice
Wanchoo in the Dirvan Sugar case: "It is enough to say that we are here dealing with
the power of the Central Government to fix prices in the interests of the general public.
It is in these circumstances absurd to expect that there would be some provision by way
of appeal or otherwise against this power."
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dealing with citizenship, speaks only in terms of natural persons.
Moreover, the recent Citizenship Act does nothing to extend the def-
inition to include artificial persons. Some High Court and Supreme
Court decisions, however, indicate that a corporation (at least one
organized in India and wholly owned by Indian citizens) may be con-
sidered a citizen for the purposes of that article.
A dictum of Mr. Justice Mukherjea in Chiranjit Lal v. Union of
India2 appears to have established the notion that corporations can
qualify as citizens under article 19:
The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are avail-
able not merely to individual citizens but to corporate bodies as
well except where the language of the provision or the nature of
the right compels the inference that they are applicable only to
natural persons.
In that case, however, the rights of an individual shareholder, not
of a corporation, were in issue. Moreover, article 19 is one in which
"the language of the provision" would seem to exclude its application
to any but natural persons. The only full judicial discussion of the
point is found in Chamarbaugwalla's case.63 Chief Justice Chagla of
the Bombay High Court (now the Indian Ambassador to the United
States) examined and applied Mr. Justice Mukherjea's dictum, which
he interpreted to mean that one
must look at the content of the fundamental right and if you find
that the nature of that right is such that it is not possible to
confine it merely to natural persons, then the Court must come
to the conclusion that a corporation is as much entitled to that
right as an individual citizen. 64
Accordingly, he felt impelled to the conclusion that the rights
conferred by article 19(1) (f) and (g) "can be enjoyed as much by a
corporation as by a natural person." Chief Justice Chagla recognized
a difficulty. How Indian must a corporation be to qualify as a citizen?
On this he said:
Sufficient unto the day is the constitutional difficulty thereof, and
I think it is sufficient to decide this case on the facts before us
where all the shareholders are Indian citizens, and all the directors
are Indian citizens. If a case arises where the shareholders are not
citizens, then the Court may well consider whether the particular
corporation is a citizen or not.65
When the Chamarbaugwalla case came up on appeal, the Supreme
Court reached its decision on other grounds. Only one glancing ref-
62 A.I.R. (1951) S.C. 41 at 44.
63 State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla, A.I.R. (1956) Bombay 1.
64 Id. at 18.
65 Id. at 19.
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erence is found to the question in Chief Justice Das' judgment. It is
not necessary, he said, "for us on this occasion to consider whether a
company is a citizen within the meaning of Article 19 and indeed the
point has not been argued before us." 6
At least two points throw some doubt on Chief Justice Chagla's
conclusion on this question. At one point he seems to assume that if
article 19(1)(f) and (g) did not apply to corporations, then they
would not have a right to acquire property or carry on a business, and
that such an intention could not be imputed to the Constituent As-
sembly. Here one wonders whether there is some confusion between
corporate powers, which would be conferred by such legislation as the
Companies Act, and fundamental rights. Article 19 does not confer
powers; it protects powers of a citizen (or rights, if one prefers)
against unreasonable invasion by the state.
Chief Justice Chagla also noted that article 11 of the constitution
confers on Parliament the power "to make any provision with respect
to the acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other matters
relating to citizenship." At the time of the High Court's decision in the
Chamarbaugwalla case, Parliament had not yet exercised this power.
In 1955 Parliament did enact a Citizenship Act which still dealt with
the subject solely in terms of natural persons. It did not act on the
invitation implied in the court's statement that "it would be perfectly
competent (for Parliament) to provide that a corporation satisfying
certain conditions should be deemed to be a citizen for the purposes
of Article 19(1)."
In 1959, the Calcutta High Court directly held that "the peti-
tioner, being a corporation, is not entitled to the fundamental rights
granted under Article 19 which is available only to a 'citizen'. '67
The Supreme Court has never pronounced directly on the point.
In a substantial number of cases, however, the court has discussed
the application of article 19(1) (f) and (g) (the clauses of interest
here) to corporate parties as if they could claim the article's protec-
tion.5 s In at least one case, the government's argument in a High
66 A.I.R. (1957) S.C. 699 at 721.
67 Cherry Hosiery Mills v. S. K. Ghose A.I.R. (1959) Calcutta 397.
38 Union of India v. Messrs. Bhanamal Gulziramal, A.I.R. (1960) S.C. 475. Messrs.
Fedco Ltd. v. S. N. Bilgrami, A.I.R. (1960) S.C. 415; Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. v.
Union of India A.I.R. (1959) S.C. 1124; Diwan Sugar Mills v. Union of India A.I.R.
(1960) S.C. 626. Messrs. Fedco, Ltd. v. S. N. Bilgrami, A.I.R. (1960) S.C. Express
Newspaper (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 578. Bombay Dyeing
& Mfg. Co. v. State of Bombay A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 328. State of Bombay v. R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwalla, A.I.R. (1957) S.C. 699. Bijay Cotton Mills. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer
(1955) S.C.R. 752. M. B. Cotton Association Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1954)
S.C. 634.
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Court, that corporations could not be considered as citizens, was not
pressed before the Supreme Court. 9 It appears that the government's
legal representatives have acquiesced in the application of article 19
to corporations. One could not conclude, however, that the same
restraint in advocacy would be shown if a corporation's shareholders
and directors were not Indian citizens.
In any event, an impressive body of precedent has developed for
treating Indian-owned corporations as citizens for the purposes of
article 19. Difficult questions would be bound to arise if a corporation
with non-Indian attributes (such as a foreign share in the capital stock
or foreign management) petitioned the court. Such difficulties, and
any continuing doubts as to the status of wholly Indian corporations,
might be resolved by legislation defining what, if any, persons other
than natural citizens should be regarded as citizens.
CONCLUSION
Some Indians who advised on the drafting of the Government of
India Act of 1935 (the direct ancestor of the Indian Constitution)
pressed for the inclusion of a Bill of Rights. The British are seldom
true believers in the efficacy of guaranteed fundamental rights in a
written constitution, and the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional
Reform overruled the proponents. A Bill of Rights, the Committee
said, would probably have to be cast in such general terms that it
would be unenforceable in the courts. If drafted tightly enough to be
legally effective, it would unduly hinder the legislature.7 1
The drafters of the Government of India Act, however, made an
important exception. In reaction to Indian political agitation for land
reform and expropriation measures, they thought it wise to insert some
safeguards for private property. 7' Section 299 of the act became the
forerunner of article 31 of the Indian Constitution. Thus, the "right
to property" has had the longest history in India's constitutional ex-
perience with fundamental rights. In this field more clearly than most
we see an effort to compromise between the British and American
models of constitutional protection of personal liberties against state
action.
There is a risk that India, seeking the best of both constitutional
worlds, may get the worst. The British guarantees of citizens' rights
rest on parliamentary self-restraint, reinforced by a long history that
has rooted those guarantees in the national tradition and by a strong
69 Chamarbaugwalla's case, supra notes 63 and 66.
70 1 Report of the joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (1934) Part I,
par. 366.
71 Id., par. 369.
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and alert opposition party in Parliament. India has not the same
history. Moreover, the tradition in India is radically different from
the British tradition in relation to personal liberty, growing from
the need of foreign rulers to retain great discretionary and veto powers
in their executive authorities. A strong opposition party which could
form an alternative government based on the same basic principles has
not yet developed in India.
Thus, the British model is not readily transferrable to India.
The American model, on the other hand, has not been wholly adopted.
The amending process, as we have seen, is little different from the
ordinary legislative process, bringing fundamental rights within reach
of parliamentary majorities. The brave words and ringing declarations
of "fundamental rights" may give an appearance that those rights
are protected by judicial process in greater degree than they actually
are.
The history of the constitutional provisions regarding property
rights seems at first glance to confirm these fears. The government and
legislature have twice made very substantial amendments, in each
instance overriding in detail court decisions embarrassing to the gov-
ernment and placing specific statutes beyond challenge on any grounds.
From another point of view, however, it could be said that the
complicated amendments have been restricted to deal only with the
effects of particular judicial interpretations which the government
found would seriously embarrass its plans for India's national de-
velopment. 72 In other words, only those specific amendments have
been made which the government felt it had to make in the national
interest. Moreover, whatever differences of opinion there might be on
the merits of the court's interpretations it can hardly be said that it
has been cowed, in dealing with property rights, by the Damoclean
sword of the amending power. The very large number of writ petitions
that have come to the courts under the fundamental rights73 attests
to the nation's awareness of the protection they offer and insures a
vigorous public discussion of proposed changes in press and Parlia-
ment. (It also attests to the complexity of the constitution, which led
Sir Ivor Jennings to comment: "The most lucrative profession in India
promises to be that of a constitutional lawyer.") 74
The history of the rights relating to property in the first decade
of the Indian Constitution, while confirming the risks inherent in the
easy amending clause, also shows the vitality of those rights. Indeed,
one may speculate whether a more rigid constitution, in which the
72 See Basu, op. cit. supra note 14.
73 See note 3 supra.
74 Jennings, Some Characteristics Of The Indian Constitution, 50.
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framers tried to prescribe once and for all the rights in this highly
controversial field, might not have resulted in intolerable strains to




19. (1) All citizens shall have the right-
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India;
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and
(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation,
trade or business.
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the oper-
ation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so
far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or
in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offense.
(3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the oper-
ation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from
making any law imposing, in the interests of public order, reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.
(4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State
from making any law imposing, in the interests of public order or morality,
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said
sub-clause.
(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall
affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent
the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in
the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of
any Scheduled Tribe.
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the oper-
ation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from
making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause,
and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause, shall affect the operation
of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making
any law relating to,--
(i) the professional or technical qualification necessary for prac-
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ticing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or
business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or
controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or
service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citi-
zens, or otherwise.
RIGHT OF PROPERTY
Compulsory Acquisition of Property
31. (1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority
of law.
(Original Constitution)
(2) No property, movable or im-
movable, including any interest in,
or any company owning, any com-
mercial or industrial undertaking,
shall be taken possession of or ac-
quired for public purposes under
any law authorising the taking of
such possession or such acquisition,
unless the law provides for compen-
sation for the property taken posses-
sion of or acquired and either fixes
the amount of the compensation, or
specifies the principles on which, and
the manner in which, the compensa-
tion is to be determined and given.
(Constitution as now Amended)
(2) No property shall be com-
pulsorily acquired or requisitioned
save for a public purpose and save
by authority of a law which provides
for compensation for the property so
acquired or requisitioned and either
fixes the amount of the compensa-
tion or specifies the principles on
which, and the manner in which, the
compensation is to be determined
and given; and no such law shall be
called in question in any court on
the ground that the compensation
provided by law is not adequate.
(2A) Where a law does not pro-
vide for the transfer of the ownership
or right to possession of any proper-
ty to the State or to a corporation
owned or controlled by the State, it
shall not be deemed to provide for
the compulsory acquisition or requi-
sitioning of property, notwithstand-
ing that it deprives any person of his
property.
(3) No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by the Legislative
of a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the
consideration of the President, has received his assent.
(4) If any Bill pending at the commencement of this Constitution in
the Legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature,
been reserved for the consideration of the President and received his assent,
then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented
to shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contra-
venes the provisions of clause (2).
(5) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect-
(a) the provisions of any existing law other than a law to which
the provisions of clause (6) apply, or
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(b) the provisions of any law which the State may hereafter
make-
(i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax or
penalty, or
(ii) for the promotion of public health or the prevention of
danger to life or property or
(iii) in pursuance of any agreement entered into between the
Government of the Dominion of India or the Govern-
ment of India and the Government of any other coun-
try, or otherwise, with respect to property declared by
law to be evacuee property.
(6) Any law of the State enacted not more than eighteen months be-
fore the commencement of this Constitution may within three months from
such commencement be submitted to the President for his certification; and
thereupon, if the President by public notification so certifies, it shall not
be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the
provisions of clause (2) of this article or has contravened the provisions of
sub-section (2) of section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
(Added by First Amendment Act,
1951)
31A. Savings of laws providing
for acquisition of estates, etc.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything in
the foregoing provisions of this Part,
no law providing for the acquisition
by the State of any estate or of any
rights therein or for the extinguish-
ment or modification of any such
rights shall be deemed to be void on
the ground that it is inconsistent
with, or takes away or abridges any
of the rights conferred by, any pro-
visions of this Part:
(As Amended by Fourth Amendment
Act 1955)
31A. (1)Notwithstanding any-
thing contained in article 13, no law
providing for-
(a) the acquisition by the State of
any estate or of any rights therein
or the extinguishment or modifica-
tion of any such rights, or
(b) the taking over of the man-
agement of any property by the
State for a limited period either in
the public interest or in order to se-
cure the proper management of the
property, or
(c) the amalgamation of two or
more corporations either in the pub-
lic interest or in order to secure the
proper management of any of the
corporations, or
(d) the extinguishment or modi-
fication of any rights of managing
agents, secretaries and treasurers,
managing directors, directors or man-
agers of corporations, or of any vot-
ing rights of shareholders thereof, or
(e) the extinguishment or modifi-
cation of any rights by virtue of
any agreement, lease or licence for
the purpose of searching for, or win-
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ning, any mineral or mineral oil, or
the premature termination or cancel-
lation of any such agreement, lease
or licence, shall be deemed to be void
on the ground that it is inconsistent
with, or takes away or abridges any
of the rights conferred by article 14,
article 19 or article 31:
Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a
State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law,
having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his
assent.
(Added by First Amendment Act, 1951)
(2) In this article,-
(a) The expression "estate" shall, in relation to any local area,
have the same meaning as that expression or its local equiva-
lent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force
in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or
other similar grant. (and in the States of Madras and Kerala,
any jannam right);1
(b) the expression "rights," in relation to an estate, shall in-
clude any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-
proprietor, tenure-holder (raiyat, under-raiyat) 1 or other in-
termediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land
revenue.
(Footnote 1. Inserted by Fourth Amendment Act)
31B. Validation of Certain Acts and Regulations.-
Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in arti-
cle 31A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule
nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to
have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is
inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by,
any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or
order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and
Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to
repeal or amend it, continue in force.
Seventh Schedule
List I - Union List fMatters with respect to which Parliament has
exclusive power to make laws, under Article 246].
Entry 33. Acquisition or requisitioning of property
for the purposes of the Union [Ed. note: included in the
original Constitution; omitted by sec. 26, Seventh Amend-
ment Act, 1956].
List II - State List [Matters with respect to which the State Legis-
lature have exclusive powers to make laws, under Art.
246].
Entry 36. Acquisition or requisitioning of property,
except for the purposes of the Union, subject to the pro-
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visions of entry 42 of List III. [Included in the original
Constitution; omitted by sec. 26, Seventh Amendment
Act, 1956.]
Concurrent List [Matters with respect to which both Par-
liament and State Legislatures have power to make Laws,
under Article 246].
Entry 42. Principles on which compensation for
property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the
Union or of a State or for any other public purposes is to
be determined, and the form and the manner in which
such compensation is to be given.
[This entry, included in the original Constitution, was
replaced by the following, under the Seventh Amendment
Act, 1956.]
Entry 42. Acquisition and requisitioning of property.
List III -
